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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Ryan Alan Forbes appeals from

the

judgment 0f conviction entered upon

his conditional

guilty plea t0 involuntary manslaughter.

Statement

Of The

The
t0 suppress

state

Facts

adopts the following facts from the district court’s orders denying Forbes’ motion

and motion

court’s factual ﬁndings

In

p.620.)

And Course Of The Proceedings

May 2014,

Forbes has not challenged any of the

to dismiss the indictment.

on appeal.

(E generally Appellant’s

emergency assistance was requested

at

brief.)

Forbes’ residence in Post Falls. (R.,

Responders found Cathryn Mason unresponsive in Forbes’ room.

search 0f the

room revealed methamphetamine and

state

(Id.)

A

consensual

stolen medical supplies. (R., pp.621.)

died a few days later of What was determined t0 be a heroin overdose.

The

district

Mason

(Id.)

charged Forbes in Kootenai County With possession 0f methamphetamine; and

two counts of burglary pertaining

Benewah County With

to items Forbes

pawned.

stealing the medical supplies

(Id.)

The

state also

found in his room.

pled guilty t0 possession 0f methamphetamine and one count 0f burglary.

(Id.)

(Id.)

charged Forbes in
Forbes ultimately

The

district court

retained jurisdiction. (Id.)

At

the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Forbes

probation. (R., p.622.)

Five months after

that, the state

ﬁled a report ofprobation Violation.

0n

(Id.)

Forbes admitted the Violation.
Forbes’ attendance in the

(R., p.621.)

Good Samaritan

The court deferred disposition on the Violation pending
Rehabilitation program. (Id.)

Dave Beck

Previously, during the period of retained jurisdiction, Det.

asked ifhe would be willing to speak with him about Mason’s death.

(Id.)

Later, while Forbes

was 0n

probation, Sgt.

Bob McDonald

called Forbes

(R., p.622.)

and

Forbes declined.

contacted Forbes” probation

ofﬁcer, Ofﬁcer Clinton Blettner, about arranging a polygraph examination for Forbes.

(Id.)

Forbes’ terms 0f probation included a condition that he participate in polygraph examinations

requested by his probation ofﬁcer. (R., p.623 .) In email communications between Ofﬁcer Blettner

and

Sgt.

McDonald, Ofﬁcer Blettner

examination

if requested

due

t0 this

stated that

he told Forbes that he was required t0 take the

term ofhis probation.

(R., p.622.)

However, Ofﬁcer Blettner

never threatened Forbes With a probation Violation 0r other sanction should Forbes refuse the
polygraph. (R., p.623.)

Good Samaritan Program

scheduled polygraph exam.

(Id.)

facilitator

Steven

Hamming encouraged Forbes

t0

Hemming drove Forbes to the

be honest and told him

that the

polygraph was an opportunity for Forbes t0 release himself from the burden of Mason’s death.
(Id.)

Polygrapher Ted Pulver conducted a pre-test interview with Forbes.
interview, Forbes

Beck about

made incriminating statements about Mason’s

the statements.

(Id.)

Sgt.

Beck asked Forbes

if

(Id.)

During the

death. (Id.) Pulver contacted Sgt.

he would be Willing t0 come t0 the

police station and discuss the statements. (R., p.624.) Forbes agreed. (Id.)

Sgt.

Beck drove Forbes

(Id.)

Along

At the

station,

to the police station.

informed Forbes that he was not under

arrest.

(Id.)

the way, Sgt.

Beck speciﬁcally

Forbes signed a Miranda rights

acknowledgement and waiver form.
that

in

he

an

inj ected

Mason with

(Id.)

Mason.

same syringe

became non—responsive.

Hamming

picked Forbes up

additional incriminating statements t0

to

During the subsequent interview, Forbes told

heroin, and then used the

effort to revive her after she

allowed t0 leave.

(Id.)

Hemming —

(Id.)

t0 inj ect

Sgt.

Beck

Mason With Narcan

After the interview, Forbes was

at the police station.

(Id.)

Forbes

made

including that he had administered the heroin

(Id.)

A few weeks later, Forbes talked with Mason’s mother, Cynthia Carmack, at church.
Carmack had been

in contact with

(Id.)

law enforcement about the plans for the polygraph and the

general status of the investigation, but later testiﬁed that she had not been asked

by

the police t0

gather information about Forbes. (R., pp.624-625 .) Forbes told Carmack, as he had told the others,

that

he

inj ected

Mason with

the heroin that led to her death. (R., p.625.)

After a subsequent grand jury proceeding,

at

Which Det. McDonald, Ofﬁcer

Blettner, Sgt.

Beck, and Carmack (among others) testiﬁed, Forbes was indicted for second-degree murder.
generally G.J. Tr.) Forbes ﬁled numerous pre-trial motions
appeal, Forbes ﬁled a motion t0 suppress

(R.,

all

confessions he

(E generally R.)

made

after the

Relevant to

(E
this

polygraph was initiated

pp.87-1 17; 237-239); and a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds including that the

prosecutor committed misconduct

by introducing

illegal

evidence and by failing t0 correct false

testimony (R., pp.181-194). After a two-day evidentiary hearing (7/12/18

Tr.;

7/13/18 TL), and

additional brieﬁng from the parties (R., pp.337-345, 348-366, 544-561; 566-571), the district court

denied both motions (R., pp.634-643).

Pursuant to an agreement with the

state,

Forbes entered a conditional Alford plea to

involuntary manslaughter, preserving his right t0 appeal the district court’s denials of his motion
t0 suppress

and motion

t0 dismiss the indictment.

uniﬁed 10-year sentence with ﬁve years ﬁxed,

t0

(R.,

pp.647-648.) The district court imposed a

run concurrent with sentences imposed in other

cases. (R., pp.658-660.) Forbes timely appealed. (R., pp.661-669.)

ISSUES
Forbes states the issues 0n appeal

I.

Did the

district court err

II.

Did the

district court

as:

When it denied Mr.

abuse

its

discretion

Forbes’ motion t0 suppress?

when it denied Mr.

Forbes’ motion

t0 dismiss the indictment?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

1.

Has Forbes

failed t0

show that the

2.

Has Forbes

failed to

show that the district

t0 dismiss the indictment?

district court erred

by denying

court abused

its

his

discretion

motion

to suppress?

by denying his motion

ARGUMENT
I.

Forbes Has Failed To

A.

Show That The

District

Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

Forbes contends that the

district

court erred

by denying

his

motion

to

suppress.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.13- 1 9.) However, a review of the record and applicable law reveals that the

district court correctly

concluded that Forbes failed to demonstrate that the

penalty” scenario that

would excuse

self—incrimination.

B.

Standard

his failure to exercise his Fifth

state

imposed a “classic

Amendment privilege

against

1

Of Review

The standard 0f review 0f a suppression motion is biﬁlrcated. When a decision on a motion
t0 suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

ﬁndings of fact that are

supported by substantial evidence, but exercises free review 0f the application 0f constitutional
principles t0 the facts as found.

State V. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,

App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power
factual conﬂicts,

weigh evidence, and draw

916 P.2d 1284, 1286

to assess the credibility

(Ct.

m

of Witnesses, resolve

factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

1

It

does not appear that Forbes challenges the

Amendment right to
pp.630-63 1).

(ﬂ

district court’s

determinations regarding his Sixth

counsel (R., pp.626-628), and Whether his confessions were involuntary (R.,
Appellant’s brief, pp.13-19.)

C.

The

District

The

Fifth

Court Correctly Denied Forbes’ Motion To Suppress

Amendment

to the

United States Constitution provides, in relevant

part, that

no

person “shall be compelled in any criminal case t0 be a Witness against himself.” U.S. Const.

amend. V.

It

has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person t0 reﬁJse to testify

against himself at a criminal

ofﬁcial questions put to

him

trial in

in

the answers might incriminate

which he

is

a defendant, but also “privileges

any other proceeding,

him in ﬁlture

civil 0r criminal,

him not t0 answer

formal or informal, Where

criminal proceedings.” Leﬂ<owitz V. Turlev, 414 U.S.

70, 77 (1973).

A

defendant does not lose this protection by reason 0f his conviction 0f a crime;

notwithstanding that a defendant

is

imprisoned 0r on probation

at the

time he makes incriminating

statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent

trial

for a crime

other than that for which he has been convicted. Minnesota V. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984);

(citing

Baxter

V.

Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976)).

However, the
matters Which

privilege,

the

V.

may

Fifth

Amendment does

incriminate him.

he generally must claim

it,

If,

not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in

therefore, an individual desires the protection

0f the

or he will not be considered to have been “compelled” within

meaning 0fthe Amendment. United States V. Monia,

3 17 U.S. 424,

427

(1

943);

ﬂ

211$ Garner

United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1976) (noting that the relevant Supreme Court cases,

taken together, “stand for the proposition

to testify

him

makes

that, in the

ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion

disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not ‘compelled’

t0 incriminate himself.”)

Further, the incriminating nature 0f a question,

by

itself,

does not

excuse a timely assertion 0f the privilege.

575 (1976)
In

E

United States

V.

Manduiano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-

(plurality opinion).

McKune

V. Lile,

536 U.S. 24, 29-30 (2002), a prisoner was ordered

t0 participate in a

prison treatment program a few years before his scheduled release. The program required inmates

t0

complete a sexual history form, and a polygraph examination t0 verify the accuracy of the

ﬂ, 536 U.S.

answers given.
status

would be changed,
Li. at 30-3

facility.

31.

The United

1.

States

at 30.

The prisoner was informed

resulting in fewer inmate privileges

ﬂ

asserted his Fifth

Supreme Court held

Amendment

and a transfer

rights

that Lile’s Fifth

that if he did not participate, his

and refused

Amendment

but the majority disagreed on the appropriate standard to apply. Li.

at

to a higher-security

to participate.

Li. at

rights weren’t violated,

29-53. Justice O’Connor,

concurring in the result, concluded that the consequences facing the prisoner if he reﬁJsed t0
participate

were not serious enough

In State V.

t0

compel him

Van Komen, 160 Idaho

t0

be a Witness against himself.

534, 376 P.3d 738 (2016), the Idaho

Li. at

48-5 1.

Supreme Court

applied these principles and held that the district court violated a defendant’s privilege against selfincrimination. In that case, during

court ordered

the court

P.3d

Van Komen to

would

at 741.

likely

After

Van Komen’s

take a polygraph

exam and

Li. at

court violated

told

him that

if he

Van Komen

told the court that he

537-538, 376 P.3d

Van Komen’s

Fifth

at

741-742.

Amendment

would

Van Komen’s

district

answered deceptively,

impose Van Komen’s prison sentence. Van Komen, 160 Idaho

rather than take a polygraph, the court revoked

sentence.

arraignment 0n a probation Violation, the

assert his Fifth

at 537,

Amendment

376

rights

probation and imposed his prison

The Idaho Supreme Court held
rights because

it

that the district

imposed a penalty upon Van

Komen
that

for exercising those rights.

had Van

Komen

Li. at 540,

376 P.3d

at

Amendment

not asserted his Fifth

rights,

polygraph and made incriminating statements, those statements

been compelled in
P.3d

743

at

(citing

light

However, the Court also noted

744.

and instead submitted

may

not have been held t0 have

ofthe United States Supreme Court’s decision in

My, 465

U.S. at 440 (“since

instead of timely asserting his Fifth

Amendment

Murphy

t0 the

My.

Li. at 539,

376

revealed incriminating information

privilege, his disclosures

were not compelled

incriminations.”))

The Idaho Court of Appeals

later

came

to the

same conclusion

as the Court in

Van Komen

When a district court required a defendant t0 take a polygraph exam in order to have the opportunity
for probation following a period of retained jurisdiction,

was making

its

disposition decision based

polygraph requirement.

App. 2018); See also

0n two

even where the

factors,

district court stated that

it

With only one of them related t0 the

State V. Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 685-687,

417 P.3d 1007, 1011-1013

State V. Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 777-781, 391 P.3d 659,

662-666

(Ct.

2017) (ﬁnding the “classic penalty” situation Where a parole hearing ofﬁcer told Powell that

(Ct.

App.
if he

did not truthfully answer questions regarding his social and criminal history, he would be denied

parole.)

Unlike both

Van Komen and Reed,

defendant in Minnesota

V.

but like Forbes in the present case, Murphy, the

Murphy, never asserted

his Fifth

Amendment privilege. Mugphy, 465

U.S. at 422-425. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth

Amendment did

not prohibit the introduction into evidence, in a subsequent murder prosecution, 0f Murphy’s

admissions t0 a probation ofﬁcer.

I_d.

at

426-440.

This was because

Murphy

did not assert his

Fifth

Amendment

step” of requiring

privilege,

and because Minnesota did not attempt

Murphy to chose between making incriminating

conditional liberty

by remaining

silent (“the classic

statements and jeopardizing his

penalty situation”). Li. at 435-436.

The terms of Murphy‘s probation required him

t0,

among

treatment program and be truthful With his probation ofﬁcer “in

made

to take the “impermissible

other things, participate in a

matters.” Li. at 422.

all

statements to his treatment counselor implicating himself in a rape and murder.

The counselor contacted Murphy’s probation ofﬁcer.

Murphy made

ofﬁcer,

I_d.

When

incriminating statements to her as well.

state

Li The United

States

Supreme Court granted

Li. at 424.

The United

States

is

Murphy with

Among

these

certiorari to resolve a then-conﬂict

individual to forgo the Fifth

t0 his probation

that the general rule noted

the “classic penalty” situation, in

Which a

above that the

Amendment privilege by threatening,

state seeks to

expressly or

by

impose sanctions capable of forcing the self—incrimination which the Amendment
434-435

(citing Turley,

414 U.S.

among

admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Li. at 425.

Supreme Court recognized

is

423.

ﬁrst-degree

privilege against self—crimination requires an assertion 0f the right has several exceptions.

429-434.

at

The information was

and federal courts concerning Whether a statement made by a probationer

ofﬁcer without prior warnings

I_d.

confronted by his probation

relayed t0 authorities, and a grand jury returned an indictment charging

murder.

Murphy

at

79-84);

ﬂ

also GarritV V.

New

Jersey,

Li. at

induce an

implication, to

forbids.

Li. at

385 U.S. 493 (1967)

(holding that an individual threatened with discharge from public employment if he did not answer
investigative questions did not forfeit the Fifth

and instead responded

Amendment

t0 questions).

10

privilege

when he

failed to assert

it

The Court

ﬁrst opined that while

probation ofﬁcer and be truthful in
Witness

Who

requirements

all

Murphy‘s probationary terms required him

matters discussed, this

different

meet

from any

his

trial

The mere existence of these

is

required t0 appear and give testimony.

is

insufﬁcient t0 excuse the failure to exercise the privilege in a timely matter. Li.

Murphy’s probation terms contained n0 suggestion

waving of the

Fifth

Amendment

Court also noted that unlike in
the privilege

was no

to

would

The Court

I_d.

at

437.

that his probation

was

conditional

privilege With respect t0 further criminal prosecution.

m,

Murphy was

result in the imposition

upon
Li.

his

The

not expressly informed that an assertion 0f

of a penalty.

I_d.

also concluded that even if Murphy held

at

437-438.

some belief that his probation might be

revoked for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege, that belief would not have been reasonable
for several reasons. Li. at 438. First, the

Supreme Court’s decisions have made

clear that the state

could not constitutionally carry out such a threat t0 revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of
the Fifth

Amendment

Li

privilege.

Further, Minnesota law did not provide for automatic

revocation of probation upon the allegation of a probation Violation, and therefore, the probation

ofﬁcer was not even in a position t0

make such

whether Murphy remained on probation.
Therefore, the

the Fifth

Li. at

a threat since

was ultimately the

court’s decision

438-439.

Supreme Court could not conclude

Amendment privilege by

it

that

Murphy was

deterred from claiming

a reasonably perceived threat of revocation. Li. For the

same

reasons, in this case, as the district court correctly recognized (R., pp.628-629), the record

demonstrates that Forbes was not deterred from claiming the Fifth

11

Amendment

privilege

by a

Forbes therefore waived the privilege by failing t0

reasonably perceived threat of revocation.
assert

it.

At the probation Violation evidentiary hearing, Ofﬁcer Blettner testiﬁed

at length

communications with Forbes in arranging for the requested polygraph examination.
p.306, L.22

—

Ofﬁcer Blettner acknowledged

p.339, L22.)

into evidence at the hearing,

do

it

13.)

since he

is

he told Forbes that

him t0

take a polygraph, “that he has t0

to attempt to initiate a probation Violation

1

9, Ls.

Tr.,

p.312, Ls.1-

further testiﬁed that he never told Forbes that failure t0 participate

polygraph examination would result in a probation Violation, and that

(7/1 3/1 8 Tr., p.3

(7/ 13/ 1 8 Tr.,

an email admitted

on felony probation, we have a polygraph condition.” (7/13/18

However, Ofﬁcer Blettner

in the

if he told

that according t0

about his

it

was not his

intention

proceeding should Forbes choose not to participate.

10-16; p.320, Ls.4-9.) Ofﬁcer Blettner also quoted from his previous grand

jury testimony indicating that his conversation With Forbes about the polygraph was “nonchalant”

and

that

he did not “order” Forbes to participate. (7/13/1 8

Likewise, there

is

no indication

his interview with Forbes that

in the

Tr., p.3

1

8,

Ls.4-15.)

in Pulver’s evidentiary hearing testimony (or transcript

was admitted

into evidence), that

he ordered Forbes t0 participate

polygraph when Forbes arrived, or told Forbes he would face consequences

(E 7/12/18

Tr.,

p.207, L.19

Beck before even taking
did Sgt.

— p.228,

0f

if

L.22; Defendant’s Exhibit G.) In fact, Forbes

the polygraph exam. (7/12/18 Tr., p.221, L.15

— p.222,

L.1

he refused.

left

With Sgt.

1.)

Not only

Beck also not threaten Forbes, or tell him that there would be consequences t0 not speaking

With him after Sgt. Beck and Forbes

left

see also Plaintiff‘s Exhibit

Beck

5), Sgt.

the polygraph examination (7/13/1 8 Tr., p.346, Ls. 1 5-23;

instead advised Forbes 0f his

12

Miranda

rights

and told

him, more than once, that Forbes did not have to speak with him (7/ 1 3/ 1 8

Tr., p.346,

L.24 — p.348,

L22).
In

its

made

order denying Forbes’ motion to suppress, the district court

the following

relevant factual ﬁndings:

Who have

This [c]ourt, after observing the witnesses

testiﬁed,

and making

determinations about credibility, especially with respect to Probation Ofﬁcer
Blettner,

ﬁnds

that the State did not

compel Defendant

to

make any

statements t0

Pulver/Beck. Notwithstanding some inconsistencies in language used by Blettner,
this [c]ourt ﬁnds that he did no more than arrange for the polygraph at the request

0f law enforcement, arrange for Defendant t0 get a ride t0 that appointment, and
then accurately answer defendant’s questions about the polygraph. He did not order

Defendant

t0

submit t0 the polygraph, or did he threaten him with a sanction

if

Defendant refused.
(R., p.629.)

These uncontested ﬁndings support the

district court’s

conclusion that the state did not

impose a “classic penalty” scenario upon Forbes, because the

state actors did not threaten,

expressly or by implication, t0 impose sanctions should Forbes exercise his Fifth
against self—incrimination.

protections.

Amendment right

Forbes was therefore required t0 assert the privilege t0 obtain

its

A comparison ofthe circumstances of this case With those ofMugphy further supports

the district court’s determination.

While complying With the polygraph examination was required pursuant
his probation, Forbes, like

to

answer questions

at

Murphy, was

in a position

a court proceeding.

conditions 0r the requirement to testify

This

is

no

different than

why

When subpoenaed
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the

t0 the terms

0f

someone Who was required

mere existence 0f such probation

are not themselves Violative 0f the Fifth

Amendment. Though such requirements may
right against self—incrimination

—

Further, as in Minnesota,

individual’s probation

is

Reed, and Powell were

they are subservient t0 the Fifth

it is

ultimately the state district court

E

— the

who

determines Whether an

Idaho Code §§ 19-2602; 19-2603.

directly threatened with sanctions

actually imposes those sanctions

Amendment

if the right is asserted.

revoked in Idaho.
all

exist,

district court

by members of

Van Komen,

the entity

Whom

and parole board, respectively. While Ofﬁcer

Blettner had the authority t0 initiate a probation Violation proceeding, the state submits such a

sanction alone, Without a resulting probation revocation,

have compelled Forbes t0 be a Witness against himself.

is

a consequence not serious enough t0

m ﬂ,

536 U.S.

at

48-51

(J.

O’Connor,

concurring).

Also
if

like

Murphy, Forbes could have no reasonable belief that probation could be revoked

he exercised his Fifth Amendment

was not required
his period

2014

to

rights.

of retained jurisdiction.

incident, but Forbes

My

that Forbes understood

he

speak with law enforcement ofﬁcers, even while he was incarcerated during
Sgt.

Beck contacted Forbes

(in the context

at that

time t0 talk about the

responded that he was not Willing to speak to

attorney present. (7/13/18 Tr., p.350, L.2

in

The record demonstrates

— p.351,

L.1.) In addition, as the

Sgt.

May

Beck Without an

Supreme Court noted

0f concluding that any belief possessed by Murphy that his probation

might be revoked for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege was not reasonable), the law was
well-established that the “state could not constitutionally carry out a threat t0 revoke probation for
the legitimate exercise 0f the Fifth

Amendment privilege.” Mugphy, 465

14

U.S.

at

438.

Ultimately, as in

its

Mugphy, the

district court in this case

reasonably concluded, based upon

uncontested factual ﬁndings, that there was n0 reasonable basis for concluding that the state

attempted to attach an impermissible penalty to Forbes’ exercise of his privilege against
incrimination. This Court should therefore

afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

self-

of Forbes’ motion to

suppress.

II.

Forbes Has Failed To

A.

Show That The District Court Abused Its
Motion T0 Dismiss The Indictment

Discretion In Denying His

Introduction

Forbes contends that the
dismiss the indictment.
district court erred

by

district court

abused

its

(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-25.)

discretion

by denying

his

motion

to

Speciﬁcally, Forbes contends that the

rejecting his arguments that the prosecutor

committed misconduct

in the

course of the grand jury proceeding by: (1) admitting inadmissible evidence; and (2) failing t0
correct false testimony.

(Id.)

A review

0f the applicable law, grand jury

court order denying the motion reveals that the court understood

its

transcript,

discretion

and

district

and exercised

it

reasonably in denying Forbes’ motion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The decision

t0 grant 0r

discretion 0f the trial court.

deny a motion

t0 dismiss

an indictment

is left

State V. Buianda-Velazquez, 129 Idaho 726, 728,

(1997).
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Within the sound

932 P.2d 354, 356

In evaluating whether a lower court abused

four-part inquiry,

Which asks “Whether the

its

discretion, the appellate court conducts a

trial court: (1)

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f

0f its discretion;

legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0

exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

MV Fun Life,

and

(4)

reached

its

With the

decision

429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018)

by the
(citing

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

The District Court Acted Well Within
The Indictment

C.

it;

(3) acted consistently

Its

Discretion

T0 Deny Forbes’ Motion T0 Dismiss

Idaho Criminal Rule 6.1 sets forth the duties 0f a prosecutor during a grand jury proceeding,
including that

“when

substantial evidence

a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry

Which

directly negates the guilt 0f the subject

is

personally aware of

0f the investigation the

prosecutor must present 0r otherwise disclose that evidence t0 the grand jury.” I.C.R. 6.1(b)(1).

When

conducting a review 0f the propriety 0f a grand jury proceeding that results in an

indictment, the appellate court’s inquiry

P.2d 708, 711 (1994).

First, the

is

two—fold.

State V. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 448,

872

court must determine Whether, independent 0f any admissible

evidence, the grand jury received legally sufﬁcient evidence t0 support a ﬁnding 0f probable
cause.2

Li; State

V. Jones,

125 Idaho 477, 483, 873 P.2d 122, 128 (1994) (overruled on other

grounds); State V. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 236, 743 P.2d 459, 465 (1987).
determination, every legitimate inference that

2

It

does not appear that Forbes has raised

may be drawn from the

this portion

brief, pp.20-25).
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In

making

this

evidence must be drawn in

of the inquiry on appeal.

(E Appellant’s

favor 0f the indictment.

State V. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 887,

908 P.2d 578, 580

(Ct.

App.

1995)
Second, even
dismissed

such legally sufﬁcient evidence was presented, the indictment must be

misconduct in submitting

if prosecutorial

prejudicial.

128;

if

Martinez, 125 Idaho at 448, 872 P.2d

Edmonson, 113 Idaho

at

236-237, 743 P.2d

at

illegal

at

evidence was so egregious as to be

711; Jones, 125 Idaho at 483, 873 P.2d at

465-466. Prejudice in this context means “the

defendant would not have been indicted but for the misconduct.” Martinez, 125 Idaho

P.2d

at

71

1.

To determine Whether misconduct

require dismissal, an appellate court

must

is

at

448, 872

so grievous as to be prejudicial and thus to

also balance the gravity

and seriousness of the

misconduct against the extent of the evidence supporting the indictment.

Li. at 449,

872 P.2d

at

712; Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237, 743 P.2d at 466. In Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237, 743 P.2d at

466, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed this balancing test as follows:

To determine whether misconduct
have

gives rise t0 a dismissal, a reviewing court will

and the seriousness 0f

misconduct with the
sufﬁciency of the evidence supporting the probable cause ﬁnding. At one extreme,
the misconduct can be so outrageous that regardless 0f the extent ofprobable cause
to balance the gravity

this

evidence, dismissal Will be required. At the other extreme, the misconduct

grand jury.

may be

becomes unnecessary to question the independent judgment 0f the
In the middle of these extremes, the court must examine the totality 0f

so slight, that

it

the circumstances to determine Whether the indictment should be dismissed.
stated above, the

showing

that the

burden

rests

misconduct

with the criminal defendant to

rises t0 the level

make an

As

initial

of prejudice. Absent the showing of

However, once
must dismiss.

prejudice, a reviewing court Will not second guess the grand jury.

the defendant does afﬁrmatively prove prejudice, the court

Generally, prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury will require dismissal only if

reaches the level 0f a constitutional due process Violation. Edmonson, 113 Idaho
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at

it

237, 743 P.2d

at

466. Dismissal 0f an indictment

and outrageous

situations,

is

a “drastic remedy and should be exercised only in extreme

and therefore, the defendant has a heavy burden.”

In this case, Forbes

moved

on grounds including,

for the dismissal of his indictment

relevant to this appeal, that the prosecutor allegedly committed misconduct

confessions that Forbes alleges were obtained in Violation 0f his Fifth
failing to correct false statements allegedly

made by Carmack

her knowledge 0f Mason’s prior drug use.

(R.,

pp.181-194.)

at the

The

Li.

by introducing Forbes’

Amendment

rights;

and by

grand jury proceeding about
district court

recognized

its

discretionary authority and the relevant law discussed above (R., p.639), and correctly rejected

Forbes’ arguments (R., pp.634-643).

Forbes has failed t0 show that the

district court

abused

its

discretion.

Forbes’ Confessions

1.

For the reasons discussed above, the utilization of Forbes’ confessions in the grand jury
proceeding did not Violate Forbes’s Fifth

Forbes never asserted the Fifth
situation.

Amendment

Amendment
privilege and

right against self—crimination

was not faced with a

because

“classic penalty”

Therefore, as the district court properly concluded (R., p.641), the prosecutor did not

commit misconduct by introducing

this

admissible evidence.

In the alternative, even assuming that this Court concludes that the district court erred in

denying Forbes’ motion to suppress his confessions,
state

noted below

district court

(R., p.283), at the

this is still not fatal to the indictment.

As

the

time Forbes ﬁled his motion t0 dismiss the indictment, the

had not yet ruled 0n Forbes’ motion

t0 suppress his confessions.

Neither

Mugphy

nor any of the relevant authorities cited above clearly rendered Forbes’ confessions inadmissible.
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Therefore, Forbes cannot

the “drastic

2.

show

that the prosecutor’s introduction

0f them into evidence warrants

remedy” of dismissal 0f the indictment.
Carmack’s Testimony

In the course of her grand jury testimony,
asserted lack of prior

Carmack testiﬁed, among

knowledge about Mason’s drug

use.

other things, about her

In the testimony Forbes asserts

constituted prosecutorial misconduct t0 elicit and/or not to correct,

Carmack testiﬁed:

And at some point did you attempt to get information from Mr.
Forbes about as t0 What might have caused your daughter’s condition?

Q:

A11 right.

A:

We — alls

[sic] I

knew was

we never knew [Mason]
[sic] I

knew

is

that

nurse. That’s all

I

that

we were

t0 use drugs,

he tried to do

knew

and

CPR

told she overdosed
I

was

on drugs, but

talking t0 [Forbes] and alls

t0 save her life,

and

that

he was a

at the time.

A11 right. So he didn’t give you any other information?

No.
@?@?.>@

A11 right. So you just indicated you did not know your daughter t0 do drugs?

N0.

And would you — did you

spend enough time With her to

know whether

or

not she did use drugs?

A:

Yeah. She — the type of friends that she had, none of them did anything
that. She had pretty good savings in her savings account.

Q:

Yeah. No, you’re just ﬁne. Let me just kind 0f bring this up. So did you
spend enough time With her in the months preceding her passing that you

like

would know whether or not based — as her mother, whether 0r not you saw
any signs or changes in her that would indicate she was using drugs?
A:

Yeah, there was no
and —

signs.

She was normal Cathryn, outgoing and happy,

19

Okay. So what else did he
A:

Well,

we were

tell

you about What occurred?

talking that [sic]

how

confusing

it is

because

I

and that the detective thought that it had
[Mason]
smoked because she found n0 track marksm on her wrists.
“Cathryn would never use a needle. I know she wouldn’t.”
t0 use drugs,

(GJ.

Q:

Did you ever have any indication from anything
event that your daughter was using drugs?

A:

N0.

Tr., p.61,

From

that

never
t0

knew

have been

And

I

said,

you knew prior t0

this

L.15 — p.62, L.16; p.65, Ls.1 1-18; p.77, Ls.3-6.)

this testimony,

0f Mason’s drug use

at the

it is

not clear whether

Carmack was

asserting that she

was unaware

time of the underlying incident, 0r by the time 0f the grand jury

proceeding. Thus, While the district court found that “[b]y the time of her Grand Jury testimony
in

December 0f 2017, Carmack had learned

(R., p.635), this is

that

Mason had been involved

in illegal drug use,”

not necessarily inconsistent With Carmack’s grand jury testimony, Which can be

construed as asserting that Carmack was not aware 0f Mason’s drug use at the time of the incident.
In any event, as the district court correctly reasoned (R., p.641), Carmack’s testimony about

her knowledge of Mason’s prior drug use would have been 0f little or no importance to the grand
jury’s determination.

3

Dr. John

Notably, the prosecutor did not reference this testimony in

Howard testiﬁed

that while

he did not ﬁnd evidence of needle puncture

independent ofthose that would have occurred during her hospitalization, such
heal and be obscured. (GJ. T11, p.53, L.12

— p.55,
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L.2.)

sites

its

concluding

sites

on Mason

can sometimes

remarks summarizing the evidence 0f Forbes’

guilt.

(G.J. Tr., p.110, L.8

—

The

p.113, L.6.)

information was not exculpatory. Further, as the court noted (R., p.641), the grand jury heard other

testimony indicating that Forbes had previously used drugs (G.J.
p.90, L.24

—

p.92, L.7).

It

would not have been

Tr., p.16,

surprising, or particularly pertinent, to a grand

woman may

juror analyzing Forbes” culpability, that the mother of a

unaware of her daughter’s drug

use.

As

Ls.13-15; p.39, L.7-13;

illustrated above,

have been

Carmack’s testimony was simply not

signiﬁcant in the context of the grand jury proceeding.
Finally, While the district court described

not

ﬁnd

that the prosecutor

Any

p.641.)

Carmack’s testimony as “problematical,”

committed misconduct

in declining t0 correct 0r clarify

difference between Carmack’s testimony and the prosecutor’s

it.

it

did

(E R.,

knowledge of the

information possessed by Carmack, was not so stark as t0 constitute a constitutional due process
Violation

when the prosecutor

The

district court cited

and reasonably determined

declined t0 intervene.

and applied the relevant law, recognized

its

discretionary authority,

that Forbes failed t0 demonstrate that the drastic

remedy of dismissal

of the indictment was warranted. Forbes has therefore failed to demonstrate that the
abused

its

discretion.
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district court

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the

district court’s

determinations and

Forbes’ judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this 21st day of January, 2020.
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Mark W. Olson
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Deputy Attorney General
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